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Lootcers, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend-ollectors: 
Corruption and Growth in Zaire, 
South Korea, and the Philippines 
ANDREW WEDEMAN 
Does corruption systematically reduce economic growth? Is so, are countries 
with high levels of corruption likely to be among those with relatively low rates 
of growth while countries with low levels of corruption are likely to among those 
with high rates of growth? According to a recent study by Paolo Mauro, the 
answer ought to be yes.' Using a data set that ranked 68 countries on a scale of 1 
to 10 in terms of corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and judicial honesty, Mauro 
demonstrated that, when controlling for a variety of economic and sociopolitical 
factors, the relationship between corruption and growth is negative, which 
implies that as a group highly corrupt countries should have significantly lower 
growth rates than more honest countries. Mauro's rigorous application of 
quantitative methods yields results that are in many ways convincing. 
Yet, his finding that the corruption-growth relationship is unilinear and 
negative is theoretically controversial. His finding is problematic in part because 
it relies on a definition of corruption that is at odds with a significant portion of 
the literature. The problem is less in Mauro's formal definition of what constitutes 
corruption. Instead, the problem lies in his implicit assumption that all forms of 
corruption are approximately equal in their impact on growth. Whereas Mauro 
treats corruption as an undifferentiated phenomena, students of corruption have 
long argued that the impact of corruption depends not simply on its amount, but 
also on its form. Thus, going back to the early 1960s, scholars such as Nathaniel H. 
Leff argued that in certain contexts corruption might help overcome obstacles to 
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growth, including most critically politically induced obstacles that might stifle or 
distort economic activity.2 J. S. Nye, on the other hand, suggested that even 
though corruption might generally harm an economy, where corrupt monies end 
up might actually matter more than the extent of corruptionperse and corruption 
was likely to be less destructive if corrupt monies stayed at home and were plowed 
back into the local economy rather than exported to Swiss banks.3 Similarly, 
Omotunde E. G. Johnson suggests that where corrupt officials invest a significant 
part of their illegal income in productive activities with forward and backward 
linkages, corruption might help increase growth rates.4 Finally, in his seminal 
piece on political corruption, Michael Johnston proposes a typology of corruption 
that distinguishes between integrative and disintegrative forms of corruption.5 
Within the literature, therefore, there is a long tradition, which extends into the 
lengthy and complex definitional debate over what constitutes corruption, that posits 
that the corruption-growth relationship is heteroscedastic rather than homoscedastic. 
This, in turn, suggests that it is possible for high levels of corruption to co-occur with 
either high or low rates of growth, depending on the structure of corruption. 
An examination of rankings similar to those on which Mauro bases his findings 
provides evidence that would support this view. In 1996, for example, Transparency 
International (TI), a German-based anticorruption group, ranked China the fifth 
most corrupt country out of a sample of 54. Nevertheless, of these countries, 
China had the highest average growth rate, 1 1.42 percent per year between 1990 
and 1995. Ranked almost identically in terms of corruption, meanwhile, the 
Cameroon saw its economy contract an average 5.42 percent annually during this 
same period, while Venezuela grew at an annual average ofjust 2.22 percent.6 At 
the same time, Singapore averaged 8.04 percent annual growth, roughly the same 
as Vietnam (8.14 percent) and Thailand (8.16 percent), even though Singapore 
was considered virtually corruption free and Vietnam and Thailand were considered 
fairly corrupt.7 
A cross tabulation of growth (averaged over five years) and corruption reveals 
that close to half of the "honest" third of the cases included in various rankings 
were in the bottom third when it came to growth, while an equal number of the 
'corrupt" third were in the top third when it came to growth. Similarly, honesty 
was not the best policy in terms of growth as over 80 percent of those countries 
with rapid rates of growth were either moderately or seriously corrupt. Partial chi- 
square statistics obtained from cross tabulation, meanwhile, show that the skew 
is actually in a direction opposite to that suggested by Mauro, with significantly 
more slow-growth honest and rapid-growth corrupt cases and fewer rapid-growth 
honest cases than would be expected if there were a negative relationship between 
increasing corruption and growth (see table 1). 
Although it might be tempting to dismiss a simple cross-tabulation that fails to 
control for a variety of factors other than corruption as a determinant of growth 
rates as incomplete and hence unreliable,8 it remains difficult to simply explain 
away the high-corruption, high-growth cases. Clearly in cases such as China and 
South Korea serious corruption has not stifled growth, at least not in the short run. 
At the same time, the old functionalist argument that viewed corruption as a 
rational response to politically induced economic irrationalities, and hence a 
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TABLE 1 
CROSS TABULATION OF CORRUPTION AND GROWTH RATES USING PARTIAL 
CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC 
(n = 223) 
Slow Growth Medium Growth Rapid Growth 
Honest +2.02 +1.33 -6.68 
Medium -0.27 -0.34 +1.19 
Corrupt -0.86 -0.34 +2.23 
Chi-square = 15.27, Degrees of Freedom = 4, Significance = 0.00417 
SOURCES: Corruption data: Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 11 0 
(August 1995): 681-712; and Transparency International, "Internet Corruption Rankings: Historical 
Perspectives," available at http://www.gwdg.de/%7Euwvw/icr.htm. Growth data: World Bank, World 
Tables data base, 1995; and Political Risk Service, available at http://www.polrisk.com. 
NoTE: The partial chi-square statistic [(Observed-Expected)2/Expected] represents the skew of each cell. 
I have included the sign from the first part of the equation as an indicator of the direction of the skew. The 
chi-square statistic itself is the sum of the partials. 
latent growth mechanism, cannot be sustained as an explanation for these cases 
because within that same high-corruption group we also have cases of obvious 
corruption-induced economic disaster (e.g., Zaire). High levels of corruption, in 
short, are associated with high-, medium-, and low-growth rates. In an effort to 
resolved the "paradox" of high corruption and growth, in this article I follow in 
the tradition of those like Nye who view the impact of corruption as contingent 
on the structure of corruption itself. 
Looting, Scraping, and Collecting 
I specifically contend that the unexplained variance in growth rates among 
relatively corrupt cases can be explained by qualitative variations in the structure 
of corruption. Given a significant level of corruption, I assert that an economy's 
growth rate will be determined by (a) how corrupt officials extract "black 
monies," (b) what they do with corrupt monies once they have them, and (c) how 
corruption affects public policy. Based on these parameters, I propose three 
alternative types of corruption: looting, rent-scraping, and dividend-collecting. 
Looting, which corresponds to Stanislav Andreski's notion of "kleptocracy" 
or what Robin Th-eobald terms "uninhibited plundering,"9 involves the systematic 
theft of public funds and property, as well as the extraction of bribes by public 
officials. Rent-scraping involves the conscious manipulation of macroeconomic 
parameters in a way that produces rents'0 and the scraping off of these rents by 
public officials. Thus, for example, rent-scraping might involve the erection of a 
state-owned monopoly and diversion of its profits into the pockets of corrupt 
officials. Dividend-collecting, while it many involve a certain amount of rent- 
scraping, is characterized by transfers of a percentage of the profits earned by 
privately owned enterprises to government officials in return for policies and 
services that allow these enterprises to earn profits. 
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A second distinction between these three forms of corruption lies in the 
disposition of corrupt monies and their macroeconomic consequences. As Nye 
points out, given roughly equal amounts of corruption, it becomes critically 
important whether corrupt monies are retained at home or sent abroad and 
whether they are consumed or invested.'" If corrupt officials consume these 
monies (i.e., use them to import expensive cars, XO cognac, or other luxury 
goods) or export them to foreign banks for safekeeping, then the economy from 
which they are extracted will suffer a net loss of capital resources. This loss will, 
according to Mauro, reduce its investment capacity and, ceteris paribus, its 
growth potential. If, on the other hand, a significant portion of corrupt monies is 
invested at home (either directly or indirectly after being exported to foreign 
banks and then re-imported in the form of "foreign investment"), the resulting 
capital loss will not be absolute. True, there will probably be some leakage, either 
because officials consume a portion of their corrupt monies or as a result of 
decreased efficiency of investment. But in contrast to cases where monies are 
consumed or exported abroad never to return, the negative impact on capital 
resources will not be total. A priori, where corrupt monies are plowed back into 
the economy, growth will be more likely than where they are permanently 
siphoned out of the economy. 
The probability of plowing back in should depend on (a) the form of corruption, 
(b) the relative profitability of domestic investment, and (c) corrupt officials' 
assumptions about the future. Because the predatory behavior associated with 
looting renders all monies, including corrupt monies, insecure, it creates incentives 
for corrupt officials either to consume their illegal incomes immediately or to 
send them abroad for safekeeping. Fear that the current regime may collapse as 
a consequence of uncontrolled corruption or that they might find themselves 
victims of sudden anticorruption drives creates additional incentives for corrupt 
officials to protect their monies by transferring them abroad. Predation and 
insecurity also create incentives for private capital flight, with the net result that 
looting is likely to trigger capital outflows and decrease investment. 
Neither rent-scraping nor dividend-collecting necessarily results in the sort of 
insecure property rights that stimulates the outflow of capital from countries 
subject to looting. In the case of rent-scraping, the effects on capital flows are 
indeterminate and will depend largely on the extent to which officials use rents 
to siphon private capital into their hands and the impact of rent-scraping policies 
on growth rates. If rent-scraping pushes growth rates down and threatens the 
security of private capital, then capital flight may occur. If rent-scraping does not 
stifle growth or creates new investment incentives, capital may remain in the 
country. Economic policies designed primarily to create rents rather than stimulate 
economic growth and expansion, however, will probably lower the rate of return 
on capital investments, thereby both encouraging domestic investors to shift their 
funds overseas and discouraging capital inflows in the form of foreign investment. 
Investment is also likely to be concentrated on rent-producing activities, including 
the purchase of the right to collect rents, causing investment capital to flow into 
sectors characterized by rents and out of sectors where rents are absent. Even if 
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it does not trigger capital flight, therefore, rent-scraping is likely to result in a 
distorted allocation of capital. 
In contrast to both looting and rent-scraping, dividend-collecting has the 
potential not only to discourage capital outflows, but actually to encourage 
corrupt officials to plow their money back into domestic capital markets. Still 
more critically, dividend-collecting gives corrupt officials incentives to implement 
economic policies that encourage economic expansion. Officials' ability to 
extract funds from private enterprises depends on the profitability of these 
enterprises. If a private businessman cannot expect to obtain a profit from a loan 
or other favor brokered by a corrupt official, then he will have no incentive to 
offer the official a bribe. The greater the expected profit from the loan or favor, 
conversely, the bigger the bribe that a businessman should be willing to pay. This, 
in turn, creates incentives for corrupt officials to facilitate private profit-making, 
because the amount of monies they can rake off as "commissions" or kickbacks 
will increase as gross profits increase. Corrupt officials will also tend to maximize 
the total amount of corrupt dividends they collect by taking a long-term view. 
Economic growth not only creates long-term income streams and enlarges the 
economic pie, it also increases corrupt dividends. The dividend-collecting official, 
therefore, operates in an environment similar to that of a corporate officer. Just 
as the CEO whose compensation is linked to corporate profits has incentives to 
maximize profits, an official whose illegal compensation is linked to economic 
performance has incentives to promote growth. 
Growth and profitability, in turn, create incentives for corrupt officials to keep 
their corrupt monies at home, because growth will create profitable investment 
opportunities, thus allowing them to obtain additional income from their corrupt 
monies. Assuming that corrupt monies are invested based on expected returns, 
they should flow into efficient and profitable sectors. Optimally, good policies 
will create an environment where foreign capital seeks domestic investment 
opportunities as well, thereby increasing total capital stock-and the pool of 
firms from which corrupt officials can solicit "contributions." This combination, 
in turn, creates incentives for corrupt officials to shore up regime stability and to 
eschew predatory behavior that would scare off private and foreign investors. 
A key difference between these types of corruption lies, therefore, in their 
impact on economic policy, which Osker Kurer argues is one of the most 
important determinants of growth. 12 Specifically, looting and rent-scraping ought 
to lead to suboptimal economic policies, either as a result of the insecurity 
associated with looting or as a result of the conscious manipulation of economic 
policy to generate rents. Dividend-collecting, on the other hand, creates incentives 
for progrowth policies, because corrupt officials receive a share of the profits 
from growth. 
The tripartite division of corruption into looting, rent-scraping, and dividend- 
collecting suggests that high-corruption, high-growth cases (the lower right-hand 
cell in table 1) should be characterized by dividend-collecting. High-corruption, 
low-growth cases (the lower left-hand cell in table 1) should be characterized by 
looting. Intermediate cases should be characterized by either rent-scraping or a 
combination of rent-scraping and other types of corruption. 
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Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines illustrate how differences in the 
structure of corruption can be linked to differences in growth rates, with Zaire 
providing an example of the consequences of looting, South Korea the 
consequences of dividend-collecting, and the Philippines the consequences of 
rent-scraping. Because the key question is why some countries with high levels 
of corruption achieve high rates of growth while others do not, I have concentrated 
on relatively corrupt countries, selecting cases in which paramount political 
leaders were directly involved in corrupt activity on the grounds that "presidential 
graft" will have a more concentrated, and hence, consequential impact on 
economic performance than diffuse low-level corruption.'3 In selecting cases I 
have held several things equal. First, I selected cases in which the countries were 
recipients of substantial foreign aid, thereby reducing the possibility that 
differences in growth were primarily owing to either an abundance or a dearth of 
outside capital. Second, I selected cases characterized by relatively authoritarian 
regimes, which are allegedly most likely to exhibit the negative effects of 
corruption.'4 Third, I selected cases in which the regimes were aligned with the 
United States during the Cold War, thus avoiding comparisons across ideological 
boundaries. I begin by examining Zaire, then contrast Zaire with South Korea, 
and finally contrast both these cases with the Philippines, concentrating on the 
Marcos era. In each case study I focus on how corrupt monies are extracted from 
the economy, where they end up, and how corruption affects economic policy. 
Zaire 
As defined previously, looting involves the systematic theft of public resources 
by corrupt officials. In the case of Zaire, officials at all levels, from the office of 
the president on down, engaged in various forms of looting. President Mobutu, 
who assumed power in 1965, took the lead. Shortly after coming to power, he 
"privatized" a third of the national budget by transferring it out of the hands of the 
Ministry of Finance and placing under his direct control.'5 At the same time, he 
began forcing the state-owned copper conglomerate Gecamines to hand over part 
of its revenues from mineral exports, often siphoning off a quarter of its gross 
receipts.'6 Other monies came straight from the central bank, with Mobutu 
reportedly diverting between US $50 million and $70 million a year from the 
Bank of Zaire to private accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe. The 
president also transferred funds out of the Banque du Kinshasa, of which he was 
a principal owner.'7 
Smuggling enabled officials, including Mobutu, to siphon additional monies 
out of public coffers. Rather than sell exports through official marketing boards 
and pay export taxes, plantation owners, including senior government officials, 
shipped products out of the country directly, often paying off customs inspectors 
to look the other way. Mobutu, who made himself a major landowner during the 
nationalization program, 1 engaged in this and other forms of smuggling. For 
instance, he allegedly used Zairian Air Force planes to fly stocks of coffee, cobalt, 
and other commodities directly to markets in Europe and forced Gecamines to sell 
copper smuggled on his account and to deposit the proceeds in European banks.'9 
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Mobutu and his cronies took advantage of "nationalization" programs to force 
both domestic and foreign owners to give them a cut of local profits or to seize 
valuable properties.20 
Government payrolls were systematically looted. Senior officials and military 
officers padded the rolls and then pocketed the pay and allowances of phantom 
bureaucrats and soldiers, as well as stealing the pay of real bureaucrats and 
soldiers.21 By the mid- 1 970s, phantom civil servants alone reputedly cost the state 
US $23 million a year. Budgets, meanwhile, could be looted legally after Mobutu 
issued a decree authorizing officials to convert "surplus" funds into bonuses.22 
Development funds and foreign loans provided yet another source of illegal 
income. Officials involved in major development projects, for example, built in 
a "corruption coefficient" that ensured that a percentage of all funds ended up in 
their pockets, with a share then handed over to their superiors.23 Bank officials 
received a cut from new loans. Often unpaid and always badly paid, low-level 
officials followed the lead of their superiors as best they could, using their control 
over the public authority, in the case of civil servants, or their access to weapons, 
in the case of soldiers, to extort bribes from the population. Officials at the 
Kinshasa airport, for example, were known to "relieve" travelers of any "excess" 
Zairian currency-and occasionally foreign currency-as they prepared to board 
their flights. Police officers arbitrarily detained civilians and held them hostage 
until their relatives paid bribes to secure their release, while soldiers and members 
of the gendarmes routinely set up roadblocks to shake down travelers.24 
Lack of reliable data makes it difficult to do more than guess at how much 
money Mobutu and other officials stole during the 1970s and 1980s. Crawford 
Young and Thomas Turner estimate that by the mid-1980s corrupt officials had 
diverted around US $5 billion worth of public funds into their own pockets, with 
President Mobutu grabbing the lion's share.25 Estimates of his personal fortune 
put it at around $4 billion in 1983 and $6 billion in 1989. Several members of 
Mobutu's family reportedly amassed fortunes in excess of $200 million.26 
Although it is also difficult to figure out what happened to these corruption 
monies, circumstantial evidence suggests that Mobutu stashed a considerable 
portion of what he stole in offshore banks and real estate.27 Additional funds were 
used to support a jet-set life-style. Later on, after economic collapse triggered 
popular unrest, Mobutu repatriated some of his funds, using them to buy support 
for his government. On balance, even though we cannot be sure exactly how 
Mobutu used the approximately US $100-200 million he siphoned off each year, 
it does seem clear that little if any was plowed back into the Zairian economy in 
the form of productive investment. Similarly, it does not appear that lower-level 
officials invested their corrupt monies domestically. Most apparently consumed 
their illegal incomes or invested them in a rapidly growing informal economy 
based on smuggling and speculation. 
The economic impact of these multiple forms of corruption manifested itself 
in a deepening economic crisis that finally erupted in the late 1 980s. At first, easy 
access to credit from international banks flush with petrodollars not only enabled 
the economy to absorb the negative effects of looting but actually created new 
opportunities for senior officials to steal public monies. But only up to a point. By 
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the mid-i 970s problems had begun to surface. Mobutu's theft of a quarter of 
Gecamines's gross receipts, which accounted for 45 to 50 percent of total state 
revenues and 60 to 70 percent of Zaire's foreign exchange earnings in the 1 970s, 
cut directly into the export income needed to finance Zaire's mounting debts.28 
Combined with Mobutu's systematic looting of hard currency reserves, this 
situation forced the Bank of Zaire to default on the nation's foreign debts in 1974 
and 1975. Bankruptcy was averted, however, by an influx of new "soft" credit 
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development. Thereafter the continued diversion of funds from the 
central bank necessitated repeated rescheduling of Zaire's debt. 
The diversion of hard currency out of Gecamines and the Bank of Zaire not 
only undermined Zaire's creditworthiness, it also crippled Zaire's major export 
sector. Export earnings from copper were needed to maintain the capital equipment 
of the mines. By the early 1990s, many mines had either closed down or were 
operating at well below capacity owing to a lack of spare parts. As copper exports 
fell, export earnings decreased, thus exacerbating Zaire's current account and 
debt problems. Smuggling added to these problems by depriving the state of 
customs revenues and profits from state-export monopolies, leaving the state 
treasury chronically short of funds. Declining international copper prices in the 
early 1990s wreaked further damage on the export sector, cutting revenues still 
further. 
At the same time that it robbed the economy of foreign exchange and soaked 
up state revenues, official corruption and predation undermined the formal 
economy. Faced with the constant threat of expropriation, demands for bribes, 
and a corrupt judicial system incapable of protecting property rights, private 
entrepreneurs had strong incentives to hide their wealth and capital by shifting it 
out of the formal economy and into the informal economy and thereby transforming 
vulnerable fixed investments into more easily concealed liquid assets. Corrupt 
officials faced similar incentives. Like the property of private citizens, their 
corrupt monies could only be secured either by sending them abroad for safekeeping 
or by hiding them in the informal economy. The net result was the gradual 
collapse of the formal sector and its replacement with a less efficient, but more 
robust, informal sector and a shift of capital away from vulnerable fixed 
investments. Official predation also crippled the agricultural sector as farmers 
found themselves confronted with low monopsony prices, illegal roadblocks that 
imposed ad hoc taxes on produce shipped to urban markets, and predatory local 
taxation that robbed them of whatever cash income they obtained from farming. 
In toto, such conditions created strong incentives for farmers to abandon 
commercial agriculture in favor of subsistence farming or to move into the cities 
in search of alternative employment, causing the production of exportable cash 
crops and even staple crops to fall dramatically.29 
Economic policy, not surprisingly, suffered. To the extent that the Mobutu 
regime sought to develop the economy, it looked to grandiose infrastructural 
projects such as the Inga Dam and the Inga-Shaba power line. Hypothetically, 
such projects would have laid the foundations for indigenous heavy industry 
based on Zaire's abundant mineral resources. In reality, these projects were not 
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only technologically inappropriate, but were designed largely to create new 
opportunities for looting.30 In the end, few of these projects proved successful, 
and most left the economy worse off as a result of the debts incurred from their 
financing. In the late 1 980s, the government made an effort to encourage foreign 
investment, particular in the increasingly hard pressed mineral sector, but the 
effort came too late as the economy had already entered a period of sustained 
crisis and few foreign investors were willing to gamble on Zaire. 
As the formal economy contracted and export earnings decreased, cutbacks in 
U.S. economic assistance and soft loans from international agencies finally 
triggered a major economic crisis in the early 1 990s. No longer able to finance the 
ramshackle Zairian state with foreign aid, Mobutu turned to the printing press, 
with the almost immediate result that inflation skyrocketed and the local currency 
lost its value. Thereafter, the formal economy entered into a period of free fall, 
contracting 12 percent in 1991, 10 percent in 1992, 10 percent again in 1993, 15 
percent in 1994, and then 10 percent in 1995. By 1995, gross national product 
(GNP) had fallen by almost 50 percent, shrinking from US $9.1 billion in 1991 
to $4.6 billion in 1995.31 
To summarize, Zaire experienced sustained looting under Mobutu as corrupt 
officials, including the president, stole whatever funds they could get their hands 
on and then consumed or exported their corruption monies. Looting, in turn, 
robbed the economy of needed foreign exchange; crippled the mineral export 
sector; destroyed formal property rights, thereby crippling the formal economy 
and giving rise to a less efficient informal economy; and led farmers to abandon 
commercial agriculture in favor of subsistence farming. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that corruption eventually led to economic collapse. If anything, it is 
surprising that the economy did not succumb sooner. 
South Korea 
Although given a middling rank for corruption (a low of 4.24 in 1982 and a 
high of 6.50 in 1992), South Korea has in reality experienced widespread, high- 
level corruption ever since it became independent in 1945. Nevertheless, South 
Korea represents the antithesis of Zaire in terms of growth. While real per capital 
income in Zaire decreased 13.29 percent between 1960 and 1989, per capita 
income in South Korea increased nearly 600 percent.32 In the process, Korea's 
gross domestic product (GDP) grew from roughly twice the size of Zaire's in 
1960, to over 33 times its size in 1992.33 Thus, if Zaire represents a confirming 
case for the argument that corruption lowers growth, South Korea represents a 
confounding case. 
A comparison of corruption in Zaire and South Korea reveals a number of 
critical differences. As described earlier, Mobutu used his power to allocate a 
share of state budgetary funds for his discretionary use, to force the Bank of Zaire 
to transfer funds to his personal accounts, to grab a share of Gecamines's profits, 
to seize plantations producing profitable export crops, and to pressure multinational 
corporations to give him a share of their local profits. He then exported or 
consumed most of these funds, thereby depriving the Zairian economy of hard 
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currency and investable capital. At the same time, he allowed corrupt officials to 
loot the state and economy to the best of their ability, so long, of course, as their 
looting did not interfere with Mobutu's looting and they remained loyal to him. 
Although his administration is often characterized as notoriously corrupt, 
South Korea's first president Syngman Rhee does not seem to have abused his 
power for personal gain but rather relied on a system of "rent-farming" to 
maintain his grip on power. After the Korean War, he implemented an import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy, nationalized the banks, and seized 
property owned by the Japanese. Such policies created rent-scraping opportunities, 
which Rhee sold off to private and political interests in return for political and 
financial support. Rhee required rent-seekers and profiteers to finance the ruling 
Liberal Party. Rhee also stole from the treasury. But unlike Mobutu, he did it 
indirectly and primarily for political purposes. During the 1956 presidential 
election, for example, Rhee had the state-controlled banks issue 17 million won 
in loans to his business allies, who immediately kicked back the entire amount as 
"contributions" to the Liberal Party.34 
After seizing power in a 1961 coup, Park Chung-hee cracked down on rent- 
scraping and profiteering, expropriating the wealth of some of Rhee's cronies, 
jailing corrupt officials and politicians, and purging corrupt military offlcers. 
Park did not, however, stop extorting funds from the business sector. Quite the 
contrary, he actually increased the squeeze. He abandoned Rhee's system of 
using import-substitution industrialization to support rent-farming and shifted 
over to a strategy based on export-oriented industrialization (EOI) and heavy 
industrial development. To finance concurrent export-oriented industrialization 
and heavy industrialization, Park renationalized the banks, pushed interest rates 
down below market levels, increased total capital stocks by borrowing heavily on 
international credit markets, and centralized control over the allocation of 
capital.35 Having gained control over the price and allocation of capital, Park then 
channeled cheap capital to selected sectors and firms based on their potential to 
contribute to development-and their willingness to contribute to Park's 
Democratic Republican Party (DRP). 
In place of Rhee's system of rent-farming, Park instituted a system of forced 
donations. The system was straightforward. When Park needed "donations" he 
would call in the heads of the major trade associations, tell them how much he 
wanted, and then let them divvy up the total among their members. Companies 
receiving loans from either state-controlled banks or foreign banks had to donate 
a "commission" of between 10 and 15 percent to the DRP. Companies awarded 
government contracts had to kickback a similar percentage to the DRP. In the 
1970s, Park added to the burden by forcing firms to contribute to a "national 
defense fund" designed to foster the development of South Korea's military- 
industrial complex. Foreign companies were also expected to contribute. In the 
early 1960s, for example, Japanese firms reportedly donated US $66 million to 
help set up the DRP (and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) and finance 
Park's election as president. American firms handed over money as well.36 
After Park's assassination, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo continued the 
practice of forcing firms, including the major conglomerates known as the 
Corruption and Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines 467 
chaebol, to fund the ruling party (renamed the Democratic Justice Party [DJP] 
after Chun took over) through a combination of commissions, kickbacks, and 
forced donations. Although uncertainty about how much money Park extorted 
makes exact comparisons difficult, it appears that Chun compelled the chaebol to 
contribute more than they had under Park. According to charges brought against 
him in 1995, Chun amassed a political slush fund totaling US $890 million and 
accepted bribes totaling $273.35 million during his seven years in power.37 Chun 
also forced companies and individuals to donate to various "charitable" 
organizations, including the Ilhae Foundation, controlled by members of his 
extended family.38 Chun's successor Roh Tae-woo followed the same path, 
accepting $654 million in "donations" during his five years in office, $396 
million of which prosecutors charged was in the form of outright bribes, the rest 
being either "goodwill" money or under-the-table political contributions.39 
The Chun administration also witnessed the proliferation of corruption. Whereas 
Park kept a tight grip on "big graft" and vigorously prosecuted corruption among 
low-ranking officials, Chun and Roh allowed their lieutenants to rake off a 
percentage of the bribes and kickbacks they squeezed out of the chaebol. Even if 
South Korea never degenerated into a "racketeering state" as Martin Hart- 
Landsberg claims it did,40 it remains true that many senior officials in the Chun 
and Roh administrations-including a dozen ministers, a dozen senior military 
officers, half a dozen presidential advisers, the chief justice of the Supreme 
Court, the speaker of the National Assembly, the chief of the National Police 
Administration, the mayor of Seoul, and a host of other officials-were 
subsequently charged with bribery, corruption, and illegal land speculation.41 
Petty graft was not uncommon either. Newspaper reporters, for example, expected 
payment for attending corporate press conferences or accompanying state officials 
on overseas trips, while bureaucrats routinely asked businessmen to pay for 
banquets and picnics.42 
Given that the South Korean economy grew rapidly even as corruption 
increased, it might be argued that corruption had less of an impact than it had on 
the Zairian economy because the amount skimmed off was smaller in relative 
terms.43 Differences in the percentage of GNP stolen, however, provide only a 
partial and incomplete explanation of the differences in growth, as becomes clear 
when one examines the impact of corruption on the flow of capital within each 
economy and the disposition of corrupt monies. The mechanisms of extraction 
were markedly different in the Zairian and Korean cases. Whereas Mobutu stole 
funds directly from the treasury, the central bank, and the state-owned copper 
monopoly, Park, Chun, and Roh did not loot. Even though the system of donations 
and kickbacks was undoubtedly coercive and firms that did not play along soon 
found themselves cut off at the financial knees,44 Park and his successors were in 
a sense selling economic opportunity. They were specifically selling access to 
cheap capital, including hard currency, without which the heavily leveraged 
chaebol could not survive. They were also selling access to profitable government 
contracts. Those seeking access to cheap capital and contracts had to pay twice, 
first by paying a commission when the capital was lent or a contract let and then 
by kicking back a share of their profits. In other words, whereas Mobutu' s looting 
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diverted capital out of the economy, Park and his successors channeled capital 
into the private sector, albeit after skimming off a percentage. 
Corrupt monies also ended up in radically different places in the South Korean 
and Zairian cases. Here we find two key differences between Zaire and South 
Korea. First, whereas Mobutu either consumed or exported a large share of his 
corrupt monies, dishonest officials in Korea kept them at home and, after 
consuming a portion of them, plowed them back into the economy. In part, the 
retention of funds reflected the fact that corruption was being used for political 
purposes. Park, for example, used forced donations primarily, if not exclusively, 
to fund the DRP, maintain its political hegemony, and thus ensure the 
implementation of his development strategy. 
After Park, corruption no longer served purely political purposes and the 
amount of money that ended up in the pockets of individual leaders increased 
dramatically. Chun and Roh pocketed upward of a third of what they collected.45 
Even then, the money stayed in South Korea. Both Chun and Park stashed their 
funds in various Korean banks and investment firms, using "false name" and 
"borrowed name" accounts, a common practice at the time.46 In Chun's case, for 
instance, investigators found US $132 million, half of what he allegedly stole, 
deposited in accounts at the Korea Investment Trust Company and most of the 
remainder invested in real estate ventures. After they arrested Roh, prosecutors 
managed to freeze $151 million held in secret bank accounts and $168 million in 
investments and seize $49 million in real estate holdings.47 Efforts to uncover 
"Swiss bank accounts" turned up little. If Chun and Roh salted some funds 
abroad, it appears that the amounts were relatively minor. 
Second, whereas Mobutu's predatory corruption forced economic activity 
underground, thus crippling the formal economy and giving rise to an informal 
economy, corruption in Korea shifted funds out of formal capital markets and into 
informal capital markets but in a manner that allowed the informal economy to 
grow alongside the formal economy rather than at its expense.48 Corrupt monies 
flowed into the South Korean curb market, where combined with funds from 
small investors, they were lent out to small and medium firms, many of which 
were engaged in export production. Corrupt monies, therefore, contributed to the 
overall liquidity of the informal economy and ensured that firms denied access to 
cheap capital were nevertheless able to obtain credit. 
In some ways, the role of corruption in shifting capital from the formal to the 
informal sector approximates the pattern described in the early functionalist 
literature.49 Corruption compensated for a credit system that depressed interest 
rates and limited access to capital. Those granted access to cheap capital, the 
chaebol, had to pay those who controlled it, corrupt officials, commissions and 
bribes. These commissions, in turn, raised the effective price of capital, thus 
reducing the gap between market-clearing interest rates and the artificially low 
official rate. Corrupt officials then shifted these funds over to the curb market, 
where administratively induced capital shortages resulted in much higher interest 
rates. Corruption in South Korea, therefore, involved a form of arbitrage in which 
corrupt officials took advantage of gaps between the artificially low price of 
capital in one economy and the artificially high price of capital in the other 
economy. 
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Whether the result was more efficient is difficult to tell. In theory, the system 
of depressing formal capital prices cut costs for capital-intensive infant industries, 
thus giving them an edge in international markets, while the concurrent inflation 
of curb market capital prices forced other firms to operate more efficiently. For 
our purposes though, it suffices to conclude that corruption and the accompanying 
system of split capital markets did not result in capital flight or capital export, as 
was the case in Zaire, and that corrupt monies were often channeled into 
productive investments.50 
Not all corrupt monies went into the curb market. A considerable portion 
helped fuel the rampant real estate speculation that threatened to create a "bubble 
economy" in the early 1 990s. The bubble economy, however, helped raise growth 
rates, at least visibly and temporarily, thus creating an overtly positive relationship 
between corruption and growth. Although it may be true that in the long term 
excessive speculation has negative consequences, for our purposes it is enough 
to show that corrupt monies were plowed into the domestic economy rather than 
exported. 
The implications of the way in which funds were extracted and allocated go 
beyond the question of capital exports versus domestic investment and extend 
into the realm of policy. Because the total profit from corruption in South Korea 
was the sum of monies extracted from the chaebol plus profits earned from curb 
market investments and, land speculation, those involved in corruption had 
incentives to promote the growth of both the formal and the informal economies. 
Promoting growth in the formal sector, on the one hand, increased their 
opportunities to extract commissions and kickbacks and claim a share of the 
chaebols' profits in the form of "donations," "goodwill money," and so on. 
Promoting growth in the informal sector, on the other hand, increased the 
profitability of corrupt investments. Across-the-board growth, therefore, directly 
benefited corrupt officials, with the result that policymakers had direct, personal 
incentives to maintain a progrowth environment. 
The contrast between Zaire and South Korea thus lies in both the form of 
corruption and its impact on capital stocks and public policy. Mobutu robbed the 
Zairian economy of the capital necessary to sustain itself. Park, Chun, and Roh 
skimmed off a percentage, but allowed capital to flow into the private sector. At 
the same time, whereas Mobutu put his money in Swiss banks, Chun and Roh 
invested it domestically, taking advantage of the curb market and real estate 
opportunities to earn handsome profits. Other Korean officials did the same with 
monies they extorted from the chaebol and other firms. Corrupt monies, therefore, 
stayed home and were available for investment. Meanwhile, because they profited 
from growth in both the formal and the informal sectors, corrupt officials had 
incentives to encourage growth in both sectors. 
The Philippines 
The effects of corruption in the Philippines during the Marcos era fall 
somewhere between the clearly harmful consequences of Mobutu's looting and 
the potentially beneficial dividend-collecting of South Korea. Like Mobutu, 
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Marcos occasional pilfered the treasury, skimming money from foreign aid and 
foreign loans, as well as setting up treasury-funded political slush funds. First 
Lady Imelda Marcos also embezzled funds from the Ministry of Human Settlement, 
which she headed.5' Until the last days of the regime, however, presidential 
looting remained relatively minor and partially invisible, at least when compared 
to other forms of corruption. 
The lion's share of Marcos's ill-gotten gains came from a diverse and complex 
system of illegal extractions and businesses. Like his counterparts in South 
Korea, Marcos extracted funds from private businesses by demanding bribes and 
kickbacks from firms seeking government loans and contracts. Unlike his South 
Korean counterparts, however, who became indirectly involved in business only 
as portfolio investors, Marcos grabbed a direct proprietary stake in the economy 
by taking over profitable private firms through a complex series of dummy 
corporations, setting up monopolies controlled by his political allies, and steering 
government loans and contracts to enterprises controlled by his cronies, thus 
giving rise to what has been called "crony capitalism."52 
Whereas the consequences of Mobutu's corruption were reasonably 
straightforward (capital starvation and the displacement of the formal economy 
by the informal economy), the negative consequences of Marcos's corruption, 
despite its extent, remained hidden for much of the time he held power. In point 
of fact, Business International gave the Philippines a middling (5.50) rank for 
corruption in 1982, and many foreign companies doing business there during the 
1 980s viewed corruption as a routine and not particularly onerous aspect of doing 
business in the Philippines."3 The Philippine economy, meanwhile, performed 
reasonably well, growing an average of 5 percent between 1970 and 1983, and it 
was not until the early 1980s that signs of economic distress began to appear. 
The consequences remained partially invisible because like his counterparts in 
South Korea, Marcos adopted macroeconomic policies that appeared favorable to 
growth by continuing the shift away from ISI begun in the early 1960s. On the 
surface, he followed the advice of government technocrats and World Bank 
economists to emulate the "South Korean model." But whereas the technocrats 
saw export-based development as the key to South Korea's success, Marcos 
purportedly believed that the key lay in South Korea's merger of political and 
economic interests. He thought that the Filipino economy should be restructured 
in a way that gave the president, his extended family, and key political allies a 
direct proprietary stake in the economy.54 By the mid-i 970s, Marcos had in fact 
built up a sprawling business empire with interests in banking, sugar, coconuts, 
bananas, tobacco, automobiles, construction, steel, shipping, telecommunications, 
television, radio, newspapers, public utilities, tourism, and oil exploration, as 
well as extensive real estate holdings and shares in the subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations. 55 
In theory, a direct stake in the economy gave the president incentives to 
promote economic development similar to those ascribed to South Korea's 
leaders. Growth, after all, increased the profits and value of "Marcos, Inc." 
Marcos was not, however, content to let market forces alone increase the value of 
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his portfolio. Instead, he used the extensive power wielded by the presidency after 
the declaration of martial law in 1972 to create rents for those firms and sectors 
in which he and his allies had a financial stake. 
For example in the case of the coconut sector, which generated approximately 
a quarter of Filipino export earnings in the 1 970s, he imposed a levy on all sales 
of coconuts and copra. The levy was collected by the Philippine Coconut 
Authority, run by Marcos's ally Eduardo Conjuangco. Using the levy as capital, 
Conjuangco bought the First Union Bank, renamed it the United Coconut Planters 
Bank (UCPB), and then began buying up coconut oil pressing mills. Seeking to 
gain control over the most profitable mills, Marcos declared that price subsidies 
that had formerly been paid directly to the mills would now be handed over to the 
new Coconut Industry Investment Fund, which in turn mandated that only mills 
owned by UCPB's subsidiary, United Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM), could 
receive subsidy payments. Using its privileged access to subsidies as leverage, 
UNICOM quickly establish a near monopoly over the export of coconuts and 
copra. Thereafter, it created rents by depressing domestic purchase prices and 
raking off the resulting gap between domestic and international prices.56 
In the sugar industry the process was similar. In 1974, Marcos issued a decree 
giving the Philippine Exchange Company (Philex), which was controlled by his 
college friend Roberto Benidicto, a monopoly on sugar exports. The monopoly 
was immediately profitable as Philex was able to keep domestic prices down 
while international prices hit record highs during 1974 and remained high in 
1975. After prices plummeted the following year, Philex, working with its parent 
company, the Philippine National Bank, and the state-controlled Development 
Bank of the Philippines, took advantage of the situation to take over heavily 
leveraged mills, thereby extending its control over the purchase, processing, and 
marketing of sugar. Two years later, Marcos granted Philex, reconstituted as the 
Philippine Sugar Commission (Philsucom) and its trading arm the National Sugar 
Trading Corporation (Nasutra), formal authority to regulate domestic prices." 
In the case of the cigarette industry, Marcos imposed a 100 percent import duty 
on cigarette filters in 1975, but then granted the Philippine Tobacco Filters 
Corporation (PTFC), which was owned by his ally Herminio Disini, a special 
waver that allowed it to pay only a 10 percent duty. PTFC quickly put its major 
competitor, Filtrona Philippines, out of business, leaving PTFC with a monopoly 
on the importation and sale of filters. PTFC then allied itself with Fortune 
Tobacco, a major cigarette manufacturer owned by a Marcos ally, Lucio Tan. By 
selling filters to Fortune Tobacco at prices well below those it charged other 
cigarette manufactures, the Disini-Tan alliance quickly established a monopoly 
over the manufacture of cigarettes.58 
From these monopolies and his other business interests, Marcos allegedly 
amassed rents, kickbacks, bribes, and "profits" worth between US $3 billion and 
$6 billion.59 His wife's family and other friends built up considerable fortunes as 
well, with several reportedly becoming billionaires. Conjuangco, the "king of 
coconuts," for example, boasted that at its peak his billion-dollar business empire 
accounted for a quarter of Philippine GNP.60 
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Unlike Mobutu, Marcos and his cronies plowed part of these corrupt monies 
back into the domestic economy. Even though the Aquino government never 
succeeded in uncovering all of his assets or came close to recovering the US $5-10 
billion they initially claimed Marcos stole,6' by the mid-1990s they had 
sequestered corporate holdings worth $1.8 billion on the grounds that they 
belonging to either Marcos or members of his inner circle, plus real estate 
allegedly worth $300 million and deposits in various Filipino banks totaling 
around $100 million.62 Not all the shares sequestered belonged to Marcos, and 
skeptics have charged that the government inflated their value. Nevertheless, if 
we assumed that Marcos stole somewhere between $3 billion and $6 billion, then 
it would appear that about a third of his funds remained invested in the Filipino 
economy. 
Marcos also exported a considerable amount of cash, laundering a minimum 
of a billion dollars through dummy corporations and banks in Hong Kong, 
Panama, Liechtenstein, the Cook Islands, the Cayman Islands, and elsewhere. 
Several hundred million dollars were then used to buy foreign real estate, 
primarily in New York.63 Around US $550 million was deposited in Swiss Bank 
accounts and $250 million in various Hong Kong banks.64 Several hundred 
million dollars may have also been salted away in gold or in other off-shore banks. 
Although, some of these funds may have returned to the Philippines as "foreign" 
investment, the bulk remained abroad. What happened to a considerable sum 
remains unclear. Some funds were used for political purposes. During the 1984 
elections, for example, Marcos and his allies reportedly repatriated close to a 
billion dollars in an effort to buy the election.65 A considerable sum was 
squandered. 
Even though we cannot be sure exactly where Marcos's money went, we have 
enough data for comparative purposes. The evidence shows that unlike Mobutu, 
Marcos actively invested in the Filipino economy, seeking profits from stock 
ownership and real estate investments. Unlike his counterparts in South Korea, 
however, he hedged his bets, exporting a considerable amount of what he scraped 
off in the form of rents, kickbacks, and bribes. As a result, the Philippines 
economy was deprived of capital, but not starved, as was the case with the Zairian 
economy. 
Marcos's export of cash, however, was part of a larger pattern of debt-driven 
development and capital flight that progressively stripped the Philippines of 
capital. Throughout the 1970s, both official and private sources borrowed 
heavily, building up a total of over US $25 billion in debts by 1982, including $14 
billion in short-term commercial debts, of which debts owed to commercial banks 
by major public sector enterprises accounted for over $9 billion. At the same time 
it was importing debt, the economy was also exporting capital, with capital flight 
averaging over a billion dollars annually between 1975 and 1982, the peak years 
being 1981, when an estimated $2.78 billion left the country; and 1982, when an 
additional $2.13 billion fled abroad.66 In conjunction with private capital flight, 
therefore, the export of corrupt monies ultimately left the economy incapable of 
servicing its external debt and thereby rendered a continuation of Marcos's debt- 
driven development strategy impossible. 
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Marcos's rent-scraping also distorted the Filipino economy to a greater extent 
than dividend-collecting did the South Korea economy. The structure of corruption 
in South Korea was such that senior officials did not have a direct proprietary 
interest in any particular firm. Abstractly it made little difference to Chun or Roh 
which firms profited, so long as the economy as a whole performed well. If 
Daewoo, for instance, did not perform well and could not hand over its "donation," 
the shortfall could be made up by increasing Hyundai's "contribution." Similarly, 
in the case of investments on the curb market, it made little difference who 
borrowed funds because profits depended on prevailing interest rates. Marcos, on 
the other hand, had a proprietary interest in specific corporations, and his gains 
derived in part from his ability to create rents for "his companies." Thus, whereas 
South Korean leaders had incentives to promote across-the-board growth, Marcos' s 
monetary interests gave him incentives to promote firm and sector-specific profit 
making. 
Rent-scraping had additional structural consequences. Investment tended to 
flow in the direction of rent-producing monopolies and away from other sectors. 
Thus, serious capital shortages existed in individual sectors, including the export- 
oriented industrial sector, which remained dominated by labor-intensive export 
processing and failed to develop the backward linkages that were one of the keys 
to South Korea's ability to achieve sustained rapid industrial development.67 The 
stunting of the export-industrial sector, in turn, left the Filipino economy heavily 
dependent on exports of primary products such as coconuts, copra, palm oil, 
sugar, pineapples, and bananas, products for which the terms of trade had begun 
to decline by the 1 970s. The systematic suppression of domestic prices for these 
products by the export monopolies also led to cutbacks in production; 
underinvestment in production; and, ultimately, declining productivity and rising 
costs. Thus, rent-scraping not only progressively weakened the primary-product 
export sector, but also hampered structural change. Finally, access to rents and 
easy credit led many of the firms controlled by Marcos and his cronies to make 
poor investments, leading to a piling up of bad corporate debt as the economy 
began to slow down during the early 1980s.68 
Ultimately, the economy stumbled from 1983 to 1985, when decreased export 
earnings and capital flight led to current account deficits and then a debt crisis. 
Concurrently, inflationary pressures mounted rapidly as Marcos turned to the 
printing press to cover government deficits and to fund his faltering political 
machine.69Soon thereafter, having skirted the negative consequences of corruption, 
rent-scraping, and capital flight for several years, the economy finally slipped 
into a deep recession. 
Conclusion 
The three cases considered herein bear out the general thrust of the argument 
that the method by which corrupt monies are extracted and their disposition, 
rather than purely quantitative levels of corruption, will affect growth. In the case 
of Zaire, Mobutu systematically looted the economy, making it impossible for 
existing productive activities to sustain themselves. When the capital-starved 
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export sector began to collapse and rampant corruption rendered property rights 
insecure, the formal economy gave way to an informal economy, creating visible 
drops in economic activity reccrded in statistics such as those compiled by the 
World Bank. Rather than starve the economy of capital, corruption in South 
Korea reallocated a percentage from formal capital markets to the curb market. 
As a result, the chaebol continued to enjoy access to artificially cheap capital, 
while other firms were also afforded access to capital, thus allowing for broad- 
based growth. In the case of the Philippines, Marcos's desire to build up an 
economy with "Marcos, Inc." as its major shareholder stimulated growth in the 
short term but in the long run led to the structural problems that culminated in 
economic crisis. 
Although the South Korean case suggests that high levels of corruption may 
coexist with high rates of growth, this does not mean that high levels of corruption 
promote growth. Corruption is obviously only one of a number of factors that 
affect growth. To the extent that dividend-collecting encourages public officials 
to adopt progrowth policies, this form of corruption may help provide incentives 
to "do the right thing" in cases where policymakers might otherwise pursue 
strategies that could directly or indirectly hurt the economy. Thus, for dividend- 
collecting to yield "positive" benefits, the basic obstacles to development must lie 
in the area of regime policy and the regime's a priori preferences. 
The efficacy of dividend-collecting will also depend on whether other forms 
of corruption can be kept under control. In most cases, rent-scraping and looting 
occur alongside dividend-collecting, with dividend-collecting tending to be the 
preserve of high-level officials and looting being more common along low-level 
officials. If low-level looting is not effectively controlled and senior leaders fail 
to establish a defacto monopoly over corruption,70 then uncontrolled looting may 
render property rights insecure and hence undermine the economic environment 
necessary for investment and growth, with the result that "bad corruption" will 
hamper growth and squeeze out "good corruption." Similarly, because the 
dividing line between dividend-collecting and rent-scraping is often a fine one, 
there is always a high probability that dividend-collecting will degenerate into 
rent-scraping. Thus, although it is possible to have both high corruption and high 
growth, the odds would seem to suggest that high levels of corruption will only 
coexist with high rates of growth in exceptional circumstances. 
Because dividend-collecting is vulnerable to both crowding out by looting and 
degeneration into rent-seeking, it becomes critically important to explain why a 
regime would evolve toward this particular type of corruption and not toward 
others. Although it is difficult to make reliable inferences based on a single case, 
the South Korean case at least suggests that elite choice is critical. But even in that 
case the decision to eschew Rhee's system of rent-farming in favor of a system 
of dividend-collecting was taken in conjunction with the construction of a 
"developmentalist state," that is, a state consciously structured for the promotion 
of high-speed growth. Without the developmentalist state, it is highly unlikely 
that the South Korean economy would have grown at the rate it did, even if Park 
and his successors did not succumb to the temptation to engage in rent-scraping 
or looting. 
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In fact, in the South Korean case dividend-collecting corruption operated as 
part of a larger prodevelopment strategy and did so in a symbiotic manner, 
wherein dividend-collecting allowed the leadership to siphon off a share of the 
growth generated by the developmental state and thereby obtain the political 
resources necessary to finance one-party dominance and after the assassination 
of Park, line their own pockets. The adoption of what might be thought of as an 
ideology of development, moreover, also imposed a certain amount of discipline 
on the leadership because it created barriers to a shift from developmentalism plus 
dividend-collecting to rent-scraping or simply looting. Finally, it was the 
developmentalist state and its ability to control the allocation of scarce resources 
and opportunities that gave economic actors incentives to acquiesce to dividend- 
collecting. Because we also find elements of dividend-collecting in other 
developmentalist states such as Japan, where major economic actors subsidized 
the Liberal Democratic Party and thereby allowed political leadership to cash in 
on the gains from high-speed growth; and Taiwan, where the Kuomintang's 
ownership of major financial institutions allows it to legally profit from high 
growth, it seems reasonable at this juncture to posit that dividend-collecting may 
well be an integral part of a developmentalist strategy or a logical political 
consequence of developmentalism. 
Although research into the relationship between developmentalism and 
dividend-collecting is clearly necessary, even now it seems possible to conclude 
that the assumption that corruption systematically lowers growth is not entirely 
justified. In cases where government elites are engaged in looting, corruption is 
likely to undermine growth and development. In cases where governmental 
power is used to distort the economy in order to create rents that elites can then 
siphon off, it is also likely to result in structural inefficiencies and irrationalities 
that will in the long term undermine development. Yet, where corruption is linked 
to a strategy that consciously seeks to stimulate growth, the contradiction 
between high-speed growth and the use of public office for particularistic gain 
need not be antagonistic. Thus, the impact of corruption on growth is likely to be 
a joint function of incidence and structure, not incidence alone as argued by 
Mauro. This suggests in turn that future comparative studies of the economic 
consequences of corruption ought to stop trying to create catch-all, universalistic 
definitions of corruption and its consequences and focus instead on identifying 
different structures of corruption and explaining the impact of particular forms of 
corruption. 
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